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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Gibbs appeals from the district court’s order sua sponte modifying his
probation from a term of six years to life.  In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gibbs argued he
was denied his constitutional right to due process because his case was not heard by
an impartial judge.  (Appellant’s Br., pp.7-10.)  The State’s argument on this issue is
unpersuasive.  (Respondent’s Br., pp.8-16.)  The district court judge who presided over
Mr. Gibbs’ case was biased against Mr. Gibbs because he felt his authority was
threatened by the parties’ plea agreement.  The judge’s comments reveal a high degree
of antagonism directed at Mr. Gibbs, making fair judgment impossible.
Mr. Gibbs also argued in his Appellants’ Brief that the district abused its
discretion in sua sponte lengthening his probation.  (Appellant’s Br., pp.10-14.)  The
State’s argument on this issue is equally unpersuasive.  (Respondent’s Br., pp.16-22.)
In modifying Mr. Gibbs’ probation in the absence of a motion from the State, and after
the probation violation allegations against Mr. Gibbs had been dismissed, the district
court’s decision was not reasonably related to the goals of fostering Mr. Gibbs’
rehabilitation and protecting public safety, and the district court was acting—
improperly—as a prosecutor in this case, and punishing Mr. Gibbs for conduct that was
not before the court.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Gibbs included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his
Appellant’s Brief, which he relies on and incorporates herein.  (See Appellant’s
Br., pp.1-5.)
2ISSUES
1. Was Mr. Gibbs denied his constitutional right to due process because his case
was not heard by an impartial judge?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sua sponte modified Mr. Gibbs’
probation from a term of six years to life after the probation violation allegations
in this case were dismissed?
3ARGUMENT
I.
Mr. Gibbs Was Denied His Constitutional Right To Due Process Because His Case Was
Not Heard By An Impartial Judge
Contrary to the State’s argument on appeal, Mr. Gibbs has demonstrated
fundamental error.  Mr. Gibbs was denied his unwaived constitutional right to due
process by having to appear before a trial judge who was not impartial. See State v.
Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 875 (1989) (“The right to due process requires an impartial
trial judge.”).  The district court judge’s impartiality is clear from the record, and the fact
that the judge presided over Mr. Gibbs’ case affected his substantial rights, as it
affected the outcome of the probation violation proceedings, which had been dismissed
on the State’s motion. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010) (stating standard
for demonstrating fundamental error.)
The State recognizes, as it must, that a defendant has a due process right to an
impartial trial judge, but argues Mr. Gibbs “has failed to establish the district court was
not impartial.”  (Respondent’s Br., p.11.)  The State appears to believe that the judge
could not be biased against Mr. Gibbs because he acted not out of animus towards
Mr. Gibbs, but out of concern about his ability to enforce his own orders.  (See id.)  The
word “impartial” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[n]ot favoring one side more
than another; unbiased and disinterested; unswayed by personal interest.”  BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, 10th ed. 2014.  The district court judge who presided over Mr. Gibbs’ case
was not unbiased and disinterested, and was swayed by personal interest—specifically,
his interest in imposing an Idaho prison sentence upon Mr. Gibbs, and not having his
authority taken away by the parties’ plea agreement.  (See Tr., p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.4.)
4The State cites State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 391 (2013), for the proposition
that “opinions formed by the judge on the basis of . . . events occurring in the course of
the current proceedings . . . do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion
unless they display a deep seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair
judgment impossible.”  (Respondent’s Br., p.11.)  The judge’s statements in this case
displayed a deep seated antagonism toward the parties, making fair judgment
impossible.  After first learning of the parties’ intention to enter into a plea agreement,
the district court said, “Well if the State does withdraw the [probation violation]
allegations, I intend to proceed on an order to show cause.  I have the ability to enforce
my orders, and if these allegations are proven to be true, my intention is to impose your
Idaho prison sentence . . . .”  (Tr., p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.1.)  Before granting the State’s
motion to dismiss the probation violation allegations, the district court said, “I’m going to
appoint a special prosecutor and we’ll have an evidentiary hearing, and I’m . . . not
going to let the judiciary’s ability to enforce its own orders . . . be tramped . . . .”
(Tr., p.27, Ls.2-6.)  The district court’s bias is clear from the record.
With respect to substantial rights, this Court can easily compare what happened
in this case, where Mr. Gibbs’ probation was extended to a term of life, with what
happened in the other two Kootenai County cases the State dismissed as part of the
global plea agreement.  (See Appellant’s Br., p.9.)  Instead of receiving the benefit of his
plea agreement, Mr. Gibbs received the harshest treatment possible from the district
court judge in this case, extending his term of probation from five years to life, which
constitutes fundamental error.
5II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sua Sponte Modified Mr. Gibbs’
Probation From A Term Of Six Years To Life After The Probation Violation Allegations
In This Case Were Dismissed
Contrary to the State’s argument on appeal, Mr. Gibbs has demonstrated the
district court abused its discretion in sua sponte modifying his probation to a term of life
after the probation violation allegations in this case were dismissed.  The district court’s
decision was not reasonably related to the goals of probation, and the district court
acted—improperly—as a prosecutor in this case, and punished Mr. Gibbs for conduct
that was not before the court.
The State cites State v. Breeden, 129 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 1997), in support of its
argument that the district court did not abuse its discretion in modifying Mr. Gibbs’
probation.  (Respondent’s Br., pp.19-20.)   But the critical difference between this case
and Breeden is that in Breeden, the State filed a motion to extend the defendant’s
probation (specifically, from seven years to fourteen years, or until restitution was paid
in full). Id. at 814-15.  Here, the State did not file a motion to extend Mr. Gibbs’
probation.  On the contrary, the State moved to dismiss the probation violation
allegations after entering into a plea agreement with Mr. Gibbs.  The prosecutor did not
seek any punishment against Mr. Gibbs, and in fact stated he “was going to be fine
with” whatever sentence was imposed in the federal case.  (Tr., p.20, Ls.18-23.)
The State argues the district court did not abuse its discretion in extending
Mr. Gibbs’ probation because it found that extending his probation would serve the goal
of public safety.  (Respondent’s Br., p.20.)  Whether or not this is true is debatable.  It is
unclear why the public would be safer if Mr. Gibbs is under the supervision of both
6Idaho and federal authorities after he serves what it appears will be a lengthy federal
prison sentence.  In any case, the district court did not consider Mr. Gibbs’
rehabilitation, which is a goal of probation. See Breeden, 129 Idaho at 816 (recognizing
“[t]he goal of probation is to foster the defendant’s rehabilitation while protecting public
safety”).  The district court did not find that a lifetime term of probation for a man who
was 26-years-old when he committed the underlying offense was necessary for his
rehabilitation.
The State also argues “[i]t is appropriate for a district court to consider a
probationer’s conduct while he or she is on probation when determining whether to
extend or reduce the probationary period.”  (Respondent’s Br., p.21.)  This is true where
a probationer admits to violating probation or is found to have violated probation after an
evidentiary hearing.  But it is not true where a probationer does not admit to violating
probation, or is not found to have violated probation.  The district court here extended
Mr. Gibbs’ probation based on allegations that were dismissed.  It is not the province of
the district court to pursue a probation violation where the State enters into an
agreement not to pursue such a violation.  That is wrong under the logic of State v.
Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228 (Ct. App. 1999), as it punishes a defendant for crimes that are
not before the court. See also Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1906 (2016)
(“[T]he Court has determined that an unconstitutional potential for bias exists when the
same person serves as both accuser and adjudicator in a case.”)  The district court
exceeded the boundaries of its discretion in sua sponte modifying Mr. Gibbs’ probation
to a term of life after the State dismissed the probation violation allegations in this case.
7CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief,
Mr. Gibbs respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order modifying
his probation to a term of life and remand this case to the district court with instructions
to close this case, and with further instructions that if any additional proceedings are
necessary in the district court, such proceedings be held before a different district court
judge.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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